Penalty Clauses and the CISG by Graves, Jack
Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
January 2012 
Penalty Clauses and the CISG 
Jack Graves 
Touro Law Center, jgraves@tourolaw.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Graves, Jack, "Penalty Clauses and the CISG" (2012). Scholarly Works. 549. 
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/scholarlyworks/549 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Touro Law 
Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
ARTICLES
PENALTY CLAUSES AND THE CISG
Jack Graves*
ABSTRACT
Commercial agreements often provide for “fixed sums” payable upon a
specified breach. Such agreements are generally enforced in civil law
jurisdictions. In contrast, the common law distinguishes between “liquidated
damages” and “penalty” clauses, enforcing the former, while invalidating the
latter as a penalty. The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) does not directly address the payment of “fixed sums” as
damages, and the validity of “penalty” clauses has, traditionally, been
relegated to otherwise applicable domestic national law under CISG Article
4. This traditional orthodoxy has recently been challenged—suggesting that
the fate of a penalty clause should be determined by reference to the general
principles of the CISG and that such a clause should generally be enforced.
The validity of fixed sums, as penalties, is currently under consideration by
the CISG Advisory Council, so further exploration of the issue would seem
particularly timely. This article examines the basis for the traditional view,
along with two distinct challenges to that view—ultimately concluding that
these challenges fail to support their respective solutions to the issue and
suggesting the continuing vitality of the traditional view.
* Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, NY, USA.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Commercial agreements often provide for “fixed sums” payable upon a
specified breach. Such provisions may serve a broad array of specific
purposes.  However, most of these purposes will focus upon one of three1
general objectives: (1) good faith estimation of damages likely to be caused
by the specified breach; (2) coercion of performance by requiring, in the event
of non-performance, the payment of a fixed sum that exceeds any reasonable
estimate of actual damages; or (3) limitation of damages by fixing a sum less
than any reasonable estimate of actual damages.  This article will focus on the2
distinction between the first two objectives—estimation of actual damages, as
contrasted with coercion of performance through the use of a penalty for non-
performance.  The former is generally enforceable in commercial agreements3
in all legal systems.  However, the latter has historically been deemed invalid4
under the common law based on its coercive nature and punitive effect when
enforced.  In the discussion that follows, and consistent with common5
practice,  I will use the term “liquidated damages” clause to refer to a “fixed6
sum” intended as a good faith estimate of actual damages, while I will use the
term “penalty” clause to refer to a punitive “fixed sum” intended to deter
breach beyond the effect provided by the standard monetary “expectation”
remedy for breach.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods (the “CISG”) does not expressly address fixed sums in either form.
While CISG Article 6 grants the parties the autonomy to agree upon the
payment of fixed sums in the event of breach, CISG Article 4 relegates
questions of the “validity” of such an agreement to domestic national law.7
Thus, the traditional view provides that the “validity” of a clause providing for
1. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18, at 811 (4th ed. 2004).
2. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 125, at 812 (4th ed. 2001).
3. However, the issue of amounts less than actual damages is also addressed briefly in Part 2.2.2
infra.
4. SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 93, ¶ 44 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010).
5. Cf. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.18, at 812–13 (explaining the common law as limiting
fixed sums to those that are “compensatory” in nature—in contrast, by implication, to those that are
“punitive” in nature).
6. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at § 12.18, at 811–12; MURRAY, supra note 2, at § 125,
at 812–13.
7. COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 74,
¶ 23 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d. ed. 2005).
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a “fixed sum” as a “penalty” in the event of breach will depend on the
applicable domestic national law—likely rendering the clause valid in some
jurisdictions and invalid in others.  This traditional view has recently been8
challenged in commentary suggesting that issues involving any agreement for
a fixed sum—whether liquidated as a reflection of actual damages or coercive
as a penalty—should be resolved by reference to the CISG and should be
generally enforced.  The CISG Advisory Council is also currently considering9
the issue.  The purpose of this article is to explore and evaluate these newly10
suggested rationalizations for diverging from the traditional view, as well as
the original basis and continuing vitality of that traditional view.
The article begins with a description of the traditional approach to penalty
clauses found in contracts governed by the CISG and addresses two distinct
challenges to the traditional methodology (Part 2). The article then goes on to
address the two underlying principles relied upon by any challenge to the
traditional orthodoxy—party autonomy (Part 3) and uniformity (Part 4).
Finally, the article concludes by suggesting the continuing vitality of the
traditional view, fully relegating the validity of any “penalty” clause to
domestic national law—without reference to the CISG.
2. THE TREATMENT OF PENALTY CLAUSES FOUND IN CONTRACTS
GOVERNED BY THE CISG
The CISG does not expressly address “fixed sums,” whether intended to
liquidate damages or deter breach. Thus, we begin with the parties’ right to
agree upon the payment of a fixed sum in the event of a breach, which is
unquestionably established by Article 6, as a simple derogation from the
default remedies provided by the CISG. However, such an agreement by the
parties remains subject to any question of validity, which Article 4 relegates
to domestic national law.  In an effort to avoid the application of domestic11
law on validity, on its own terms, one might suggest that we look to the CISG
to interpret and apply that domestic law, or one might suggest that penalty
clauses do not actually raise an issue of validity, as that term is used in CISG
8. See, e.g., JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION § 408.1, at 582 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY,
UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA 24 (2d ed. 2004).
9. See infra Part 2.2.
10. CISG Advisory Council, Schedule of Work, at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?sid=113.
11. See infra Part 2.1.
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Article 4.  However, each of these suggested rationales fails to establish a12
sound basis for reference to the CISG in deciding the enforceability of a
penalty clause, and nothing in Articles 6 or 7, or their underlying principles,
provides any basis for a contrary result.13
2.1. Article 4 and the “Validity” of a Penalty Clause
CISG Article 4 provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided in
this Convention, it is not concerned with the validity of a contract or any of
its provisions . . . .”  Thus, the initial question in determining whether or not14
the Convention governs “penalty” clauses is whether such clauses raise
questions of “validity,” as that term is used in Article 4. An issue of illegality,
such as to render a contract “void” is almost certainly one of “validity,”
governed by otherwise applicable law—and not by the Convention.  U.S. law15
governing the sale of goods renders a “penalty” clause “void”  based on the16
common law policies abhorring penalties in contract remedies, in much the
same manner that U.S. law would render a contract for the sale of heroin void.
Thus, U.S. domestic law firmly establishes that the issue is one of “validity,”
under U.S. law. Domestic law characterizations of “validity” are not, however,
dispositive.17
The “validity exception” of Article 4(a) is limited by its introductory
clause, “except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention.”
Moreover, this phrase is broadly read to include express provisions of the
CISG that impliedly address a particular issue and, thereby, preclude resort to
any domestic law of validity.  Thus, to the extent that the CISG expressly or18
impliedly addresses the issue directly, it will be governed by the
Convention—and not by domestic law—irrespective of whether it is
characterized under domestic law as a question of validity.  A common19
12. See infra Part 2.2.
13. See infra Part 2.3.
14. CISG art. 4(a).
15. See HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 78 (using the example of the validity of a contract for the sale
of heroin—an agreement rendered invalid for illegality in many jurisdictions).
16. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2003).
17. See, e.g., PETER HUBER, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS 21
(2007).
18. Franco Ferrari, The Interaction between the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods and Domestic Remedies, in 71 RABELS ZEITSHCRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALS PRIVATRECHT 52, 64–66 (2007), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
ferrari16.html.
19. Milena Djordjevic, Declaration of Price Reduction under the CISG: Much Ado About Nothing?,
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example is provided by CISG Article 11, which eliminates any requirements
with respect to form. Some domestic laws may require a signed writing and
characterize the issue as one of “validity.” However, this form requirement
would not be a matter of validity, as the term is used in Article 4, because it
is expressly addressed in Article 11.  In a similar vein, resort to domestic law20
and characterizations of validity may be precluded in the event the issue is
impliedly governed by the CISG.  However, there is nothing in the21
Convention that expressly or impliedly addresses the issue of penalty
clauses.  As such, traditional commentaries on the Convention have22
consistently concluded that the validity of a penalty clause must be determined
by reference to domestic national law.23
2.2. Challenges to the Traditional Orthodoxy
Pascal Hachem and Bruno Zeller have recently suggested, in separate
challenges to the traditional orthodoxy, that the validity of a penalty clause in
a contract otherwise governed by the CISG must also be determined by
reference to the CISG, albeit under somewhat different theories. Hachem
acknowledges that Article 4 provides that the validity of fixed sums is
governed by domestic law,  but suggests that one must apply international24
standards in interpreting and applying that domestic law—notwithstanding
domestic interpretations to the contrary.  He then suggests that such25
international standards must be derived from the CISG.  In contrast, Zeller26
suggests that the question of fixed sums is not one of validity under Article 4
at all and is, therefore, governed directly by the CISG.  However, upon closer27
in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INT’L SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 69, 69, ¶ 15 (Kroll, Mistelis
& Viscasillas eds., 2011).
20. See HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 583; Secretariat Commentary to CISG art. 4, para. 3
(Commentary on Article 4 of the 1978 Draft).
21. See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 17, at 21 (providing an example whereby any domestic law treating
errors or mistakes with respect to the character of the goods as an issue of validity would be impliedly
preempted by the complete treatment of the relevant issues within the Convention).
22. Professor Zeller’s position to the contrary is fully addressed infra in Part 2.2.2.
23. See, e.g., HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 582; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 8, at 24; Schlechtriem &
Schwenzer, supra note 7, at 74, ¶ 23; Djordjevic, supra note 19, at 74–75.
24. Pascal Hachem, Fixed Sums in CISG Contracts, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 217,
221–22 (2009) [hereinafter Hachem, Fixed Sums]; Pascal Hachem, Agreed Sums in CISG Contracts, 3
BELGRADE L. REV. 140, 145 (2011) [hereinafter Hachem, Agreed Sums]; Schwenzer, supra note 4, at 93.
25. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222; Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 145.
26. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222; Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 145; see
also infra Part 2.2.1.
27. See generally Bruno Zeller, Penalty Clauses: Are They Governed by the CISG?, 23 PACE INT’L
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examination, neither of these two theories provides a sound basis for reference
to the CISG in determining the validity of a fixed sum.
2.2.1. Interpretation and Application of Domestic Law Governing Validity
by Reference to the CISG
Having unequivocally acknowledged that Article 4 relegates the validity
of a penalty clause to otherwise applicable domestic national law, Pascal
Hachem nevertheless suggests that the issue must be ultimately resolved by
reference to the general principles of the CISG. He reaches this conclusion by
arguing, with scant support,  that one must interpret and apply the governing28
domestic law “by applying an international standard,” and further suggesting
that the issue “must not be decided in accordance with domestic case law.”29
This is a rather remarkable proposition—and one that seemingly stands the
familiar principle of uniformity under CISG Article 7(1) on its head.
In circumstances in which a matter is deemed to raise a question of
validity under Article 4, the issue is said to reflect an “external gap” in the
Convention.  While Article 7 plays a preeminent role in filling “internal30
gaps” in the Convention—issues governed, but not expressly settled within
it—Article 7 plays no role in filling “external gaps.”  Hachem relies on31
Article 7(1) in support of his proposed “international standard” for
interpreting and applying domestic law. However, such an approach is
L. REV. 1, 3 (2011); see infra Part 2.2.2.
28. See Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222 (providing no authority for the use of the
Convention to interpret and apply domestic law); SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 4, at 93 n.151
(citing only Hachem’s previous article for authority); Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 145 (citing
only Hachem’s previous article and commentary for authority, along with a citation to a commentary by
Ferrari). The Ferrari commentary cited by Hachem does not, however, appear to provide any support for
the idea of interpreting domestic law by reference to the Convention. In paragraph 22, Ferrari merely
addresses the “functional equivalence” test for determining whether the issue is governed by domestic law
or the CISG. See Franco Ferrari, in SCHLECHTRIEM AND SCHWENZER: KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN
UN-KAUFRECHT, art. 4, ¶ 22 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2008). Inasmuch as Hachem
starts from the premise that a penalty clause is governed by domestic law, the “functional equivalence” test
arguably has no relevance to his analysis. Ferrari does go on, in the following paragraph 23, to suggest that
one must resort to both domestic law and the CISG in applying the “functional equivalence” test. But this
is done only for purposes of determining whether the CISG preempts the application of domestic law—and
not for purposes of using the Convention to interpret that domestic law.
29. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 222; see also Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24,
at 145 (explaining that the underlying policies of the CISG must displace an relevant domestic policies in
interpreting and applying governing domestic law).
30. HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 79.
31. Id.
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inconsistent with one of the most basic principles of Article 7 itself—the
principle of uniform application of law.
In recognizing the international character of the CISG and requiring a
consistent interpretation and application of its provisions across national
borders, Article 7(1) seeks to promote a uniform application of the CISG,
irrespective of forum or circumstances. Notably, the Uniform Commercial
Code—one of the domestic laws that Hachem would interpret and apply by
reference to the CISG, instead of domestic case law and policies—also
provides for uniform interpretation and application.  No serious commentator32
would argue that one should resort to domestic law to interpret the CISG.33
This would be flatly contrary to the requirement of Article 7(1), because it
would undermine uniformity. It seems remarkably inconsistent, and somewhat
hypocritical, to resort to the principle of “internationality” contained in Article
7(1) in a manner that would equally undermine the principle of “uniformity”
mandated by the domestic law at issue.
The use of the CISG to interpret domestic law lacks support within the
CISG itself, because it is contrary to the basic principle of uniformity in the
interpretation and application of law—whether the CISG or domestic national
law. Thus, absent some basis for asserting that the CISG directly governs the
validity of a penalty clause, the issue should be determined solely by reference
to domestic law.
2.2.2. Direct Application of the CISG to Enforce a Penalty Clause
Bruno Zeller asserts that the validity of a penalty clause is directly
governed by the CISG because the CISG provides a “functionally adequate
solution” to the issue, thus avoiding any need to resort to domestic national
law under Article 4.  In effect, Zeller suggests that an express provision of the34
CISG—Article 74—impliedly answers the question, thereby avoiding the
operation of the “validity exception” under Article 4(a). Zeller also seems to
suggest a separate argument based on domestic law characterizations. This
latter issue will be addressed first in order to avoid conflating the two.
Zeller appears to argue that the domestic common law approach to
penalty clauses is actually one of “non-enforcement,” rather than one of
32. See U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (providing interpretation and application of the Code to promote its
underlying purposes and policies, including uniformity); U.C.C. § 1-301 (providing no distinction between
the application of the Code in domestic and international transactions).
33. Of course, U.S. courts have all too often done so, but that does not justify this improper practice.
34. Zeller, supra note 27, at 8.
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“invalidity,” thus apparently avoiding any invocation of Article 4—even under
a domestic law characterization of the issue.  However, this characterization35
is contrary to at least U.S. law governing the sale of goods, which specifically
characterizes a penalty clause as “void,”  just as any illegal transaction is36
deemed void. Inasmuch as a “penalty” clause raises a question of “validity,”
it is not governed by the CISG, unless one can find some basis within the
CISG for avoiding the validity exception of Article 4. Answering this latter
question requires an autonomous determination as to whether a penalty clause
raises an issue of “validity,” as that term is used in Article 4.
Zeller relies on the “functional equivalence test” of whether an issue is
one of “validity,” as the term is used in Article 4. This test provides a means
of determining whether the issue falls within the phrase “except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Convention,” and is therefore governed by the
Convention directly.  In searching for a “functional equivalent” solution37
regarding any issues raised by penalty clauses, Zeller points us to Article 74.38
Zeller focuses on the second sentence of Article 74—the foreseeability
limitation—seemingly to argue that Article 74 at least impliedly provides for
enforcement of penalty clauses, because such a clause is foreseeable, as an
express provision of the parties’ agreement. However, this arguably amounts
to the use of the “tail” (foreseeability) to “wag the dog” (compensation for the
aggrieved party’s expectation damages). Instead, one should begin any
analysis of Article 74 with its first sentence.
Article 74 provides for actual damages caused by the breach. Such
“[d]amages must not place the aggrieved party in a better position that it
would have enjoyed had the contract been properly performed.”  In contrast,39
Zeller himself admits that a penalty clause, by its nature, provides for an
amount that is “greater than the actual damage.”  An award of punitive40
damages in excess of a party’s actual loss is contrary to the basic principles
35. Id. at 8–9. Zeller also asserts that domestic law rendering excessive fixed sums void, as a
penalty, is somehow unfair in that it has no effect on sums deemed too small. Id. at 4–5. However,
unconscionability provides the appropriate mechanism in that case. See Joseph M. Lookofsky, Loose Ends
and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 403, 409–11 (1991) (addressing and explaining the application of unconscionability doctrine to
fixed sums that substantially understate actual damages in the North Sea Cranes case).
36. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1); see also HONNOLD, supra note 8, at 582.
37. See Ferrari, supra note 18, at 64–66.
38. See Zeller, supra note 27, at 10–13.
39. CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 74, para. 9, available
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/CISG-AC-op6.html. Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, Villanova
University School of Law, Villanova, Pennsylvania, USA.
40. Zeller, supra note 27, at 1.
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of Article 74.  Thus, if one were to find a “functionally equivalent” test in the41
first sentence of Article 74, it would be far more likely to preclude the
enforcement of a penalty clause than to support it, as urged by Zeller.  The42
second sentence—the foreseeability test—does not, as Zeller suggests, provide
a fully sufficient independent basis for enforcing anything. Instead, it simply
provides a limit on those damages otherwise provable under the first sentence,
as indicated by its first two words—“such damages.” In other words, “such
damages” as established under the first sentence are further subject to the
additional limit of foreseeability under the second sentence. This article does
not suggest that the enforcement of a penalty clause is to be determined by
reference to the CISG. However, if it is so determined, then Article 74 in fact
provides a powerful argument against the enforcement of any agreement to
the payment of a penalty, as damages.43
Moreover, the Secretariat Commentary to CISG Article 46 specifically
characterizes the issue raised by a penalty clause as one of “validity.”  Article44
46 provides a buyer with a broad right to require specific performance by the
seller, and a penalty clause is, in some respects, similar in that it may, by
contract, seek to deter breach and require performance.  This broad right to45
performance in Article 46 might reasonably be seen as an express provision
of the Convention impliedly precluding resort to domestic law governing the
validity of a penalty clause intended as a contractual means of coercing
performance. However, the Secretariat Commentary makes clear that such is
not the case, explaining that Article 46 “does not have the effect of making
[penalty] clauses valid in those legal systems which do not otherwise
recognize their validity.”46
Admittedly, the Article 46 Secretariat Commentary does not directly
address the issue of whether Article 74 might somehow preclude an
41. See CISG-AC Opinion No. 6, supra note 39.
42. Zeller also argues that certain actual damages are difficult to ascertain, thereby justifying the
enforcement of a penalty clause. See Zeller, supra note 27, at 12–13. However, such “actual” damages may
be addressed through a proper “liquidated damages” clause. There is no need to enforce “penalties” to
achieve this result, and the distinction remains important under the common law.
43. See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: LAW AND PRACTICE, para. 11.38
(2d ed. 2007) (suggesting that the CISG governs the issue and renders penalties unenforceable, as
inconsistent with Article 74).
44. See Secretariat Commentary, art. 42 [draft counterpart to CISG art. 46], para. 10, available at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/secomm/secomm-46.html (noting that “penalty clauses” are
“invalid” in some legal systems where their “validity” may not be recognized).
45. Id.
46. Id. The connection between penalty clauses and the remedy of specific performance, as well as
the significance of Article 28, are explored more fully infra Part 4.
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examination of the validity of a penalty clause under domestic law. However,
it would seem quite logical that the Secretariat Commentary would address
any provision most likely to have such an effect, such as Article 46, and would
seem equally illogical that the Secretariat Commentary would be silent
regarding another provision that would ultimately dictate that the entire issue
is governed by the CISG. In short, Article 74 fails to establish that penalty
clauses are otherwise governed by the CISG, and their validity is fully
governed by domestic national law.47
Finally, the drafting history of the CISG strongly suggests that it was not
intended to govern penalty clauses. While specifically recognizing the
importance of the issue, the drafters deemed it too complex and problematic
to be addressed at the time, specifically leaving it for otherwise applicable
law —whether in a subsequent convention or domestic law. No uniform48
solution has yet been adopted,  thus leaving the issue to otherwise applicable49
domestic national law.
2.3. Reliance on Articles 6 and 7 to Support Reference to the CISG in
Validating a Penalty Clause
At bottom, the approaches of both Hachem and Zeller rest on the
principles found in Articles 6 and 7 of the CISG.  However, nothing in either50
of these articles mandates a departure from the traditional rule that the validity
of fixed sums must be determined entirely by reference to otherwise
applicable law—and not the CISG. As explained below, the parties’ exercise
of autonomy under Article 6 remains limited to any issue of validity under
applicable law—and not the CISG and Article 7(1) has no application to the51
issue of validity, because that issue is not governed by the CISG.  Moreover,52
47. Hachem also attempts to rely on Article 74 to support the idea that penalties are fully enforceable
by reference to the general principles of the CISG, as found in this provision. Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra
note 24, at 146. However, his arguments are equally unavailing for the same reasons explained herein.
48. Djordjevic, supra note 19, at 74, ¶ 26; Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 218.
49. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 218.
50. See generally Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24; Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24; see
generally Zeller, supra note 27; see also Phanesh Koneru, The Int’l Interpretation of the UN Convention
on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 105, 140–42 (1997) (suggesting that any provision for a fixed sum must be governed by the
Convention solely by reference to Articles 6 and 7).
51. See infra Part 3.
52. See infra Part 4.
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the lack of such uniformity with respect to the general principles underlying
differential treatment of penalty clauses is recognized within the CISG itself.
3. ARTICLE 6 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PARTY AUTONOMY
CISG Article 6 admittedly supports the idea of party autonomy as one of
the most fundamental general principles underlying the CISG.  Thus, the53
parties may certainly derogate from the default rule of Article 74, providing
for expectation damages, and, instead, fix a penal sum in the event of a
breach.  However, as a means of overcoming the express language of Article54
4, this argument either proves too little, or it proves too much. It proves too
little in that the parties’ autonomy—no matter how expansive under Article
6—is expressly subject to the applicable law governing the exercise of that
autonomy, a subject that CISG Article 4 expressly leaves to other law. The
late Professor Farnsworth explains the relationship in hierarchical terms as
follows:
Article 6 purports to give the parties an unqualified power to vary the effect of the
Convention by agreement. On the other hand, article 4 makes it clear that, absent a
contrary provision, the Convention does not affect any rule of domestic law dealing with
the “validity” of a contract provision. Taken together, articles 6 and 4 create a tripartite
hierarchy, with domestic law on validity at the top, the agreement of the parties in the
middle, and the Convention at the bottom.55
Thus, the parties’ autonomy cannot serve as a basis for ignoring otherwise
applicable domestic laws governing validity, including domestic law
governing penalty clauses, because the exercise of that autonomy remains
subject to Article 4.
In attempting to narrow the application of Article 4, one might perhaps
suggest that the parties’ autonomy under Article 6 is subject only to limits on
validity relating to the issue of consent. If there is no question of the validity
of consent,  then the general principle of party autonomy under Article 656
gives life to a “penalty” clause notwithstanding Article 4. However, under this
approach, the parties’ consent under Article 6 would overcome an otherwise
53. See Michael Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through the
Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–41 (1996).
54. Djordjevic, supra note 19, at 74, ¶ 26.
55. E. Allan Farnsworth, Review of Standard Forms or Terms Under the Vienna Convention, 21
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 441 (1988) (emphasis added).
56. Issues of the validity of consent would likely include issues such as fraud, duress, or
capacity—all of which arguably go to the effectiveness of any exercise of autonomous consent.
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applicable law rendering a contract illegal—such as the earlier referenced
contract for the same of heroin.  Thus, an argument limiting validity to issues57
of consent clearly proves too much. At the end of the day, Article 6 does not
provide any basis for ignoring the express language of Article 4, which
relegates the issue of the validity of a penalty clause to otherwise applicable
domestic law.
4. ARTICLE 7 AND THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIFORMITY
Article 7 of the CISG unquestionably mandates an internationally uniform
approach to the interpretation of the Convention by reference to the general
principles upon which it is based.  However, Article 7 has no application to58
issues not governed by the Convention.  Moreover, the treatment of penalty59
clauses is not internationally uniform, and the divergence between civil and
common law treatment is recognized within the CISG itself.60
4.1. Article 7(1) and the Interpretation of the Convention
Article 7(1) is limited by its own language to “the interpretation of [the
CISG].” Article 4(a) provides that the CISG “is not concerned with . . . the
validity of the contract or any of its provisions . . . .” Thus, Article 7(1) and
its mandate “to promote uniformity” arguably have no relevance in
determining the validity of a penalty clause.
Perhaps one might suggest that Article 7(1) is in fact being used to
interpret the provisions of the CISG governing damages, which would
arguably “govern” a penalty clause, assuming such a clause to be valid.
However, this seems to conflate two distinct issues—that of validity and that
of the law governing such clause “if it is valid.” While the use of Article 7(1)
is perfectly appropriate in the case of the latter, it seems premature in the case
of the former.
To the extent that one might argue that Article 7(1) mandates a preference
for international norms over domestic law, generally, on issues not governed
by the convention, this seems inconsistent with the approach provided in
Article 7(2). Even in the case of issues governed by the convention, Article
7(2) mandates reference to the “general principles on which [the CISG] is
57. See supra Part 2.1.
58. CISG arts. 7(1) and 7(2).
59. See infra Part 4.1.
60. See infra Part 4.2.
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based,” but “in the absence of such principles,” defers to domestic national
law—not to international norms. Moreover, even if one does look for such
international uniformity, that search yields a clear and significant divide
between the civil and common law worlds.
4.2. Comparative Legal Treatment of Penalty Clauses
The treatment of penalty clauses is fundamentally different, as between
civil and common law legal systems. A penalty clause is generally enforceable
under the civil law,  while it is not enforceable under the common law.61 62
Moreover, the same theoretical underpinnings of these different approaches
to penalty clauses can also be found in the two legal systems’ different
approaches to the remedy of specific performance.63
4.2.1. Civil Law
The civil law generally enforces fixed sums, whether intended to
approximate damages or to deter breach. Thus, a fixed sum intended as a
“penalty” will typically be enforced. While a court may adjust the amount of
a “penalty” it considers excessive, the fact that the “penalty” tends to deter
breach does not, itself, preclude enforcement. The sole issue is the amount of
the penalty and whether that amount is deemed excessive.64
In view of the fact that most civil law regimes provide limits on the
amount of a penalty clause, one might be tempted to suggest a similarity
between the civil and common law approach in that each provides certain
limits on the amount of a contractually agreed upon fixed sum. However, any
such suggestion fails to account for the fundamentally different approaches
taken by the two systems in justifying such limits. As explained below, the
common law abhors any penalty—irrespective of the amount.
61. See infra Part 4.2.1.
62. See infra Part 4.2.2.
63. See infra Part 4.3.2.
64. Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 142.
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4.2.2. Common Law
The common law  grants contracting parties substantial autonomy in65
defining their respective rights and obligations. However, their autonomy in
defining remedies for breach is subject to certain limits,  including limits on66
“fixed sums” payable in the event of breach. A sum fixing an amount or
method of determining “liquidated damages” is enforceable, while a sum
fixing a “penalty” intended to deter breach is void.67
The parties to a contract may stipulate in advance to a specified amount
or methodology for determining damages in the event of a specified breach.
As long as the amount represents a reasonable effort to ascertain in advance
or “liquidate” damages that might otherwise be uncertain or difficult to prove,
the provision will be enforceable as “liquidated damages.”  Such clauses68
offer substantial utility in providing a remedy in the event of breach while
retaining the basic common law focus on “compensatory” rather than
“punitive” damages for breach of contract.  In contrast, a “penalty” clause69
runs afoul of this same basic approach.
A “penalty” clause goes beyond compensating the aggrieved party for its
promissory loss and has the effect of deterring breach and compelling
performance.  This is known as the “in terrorem” effect of a penalty clause70
and is, in fact, the intent of such a clause.  This deterrent effect is inconsistent71
with the fundamental remedial approach of the common law focus on
redressing breach through damages—but not compelling performance.72
Moreover, it would be unjust to “punish” a party based on what is essentially
a “strict liability” standard for breach of contract.  Common law damages are73
intended to be, in effect, neutral as between performance and payment of
65. This article does not purport to provide a complete survey of common law legal regimes or any
nuanced differences between them in the treatment of “fixed sums.” Instead, the U.S. common law, as well
as its reflection in U.C.C. Article 2, is used here as exemplary of the common law approach to the issue.
66. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-718(2)–(3) (providing statutory limits on the parties’ contractual rights
to limit or exclude certain remedies).
67. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 811–17.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149 (8th ed. 2011).
73. XCO Int’l, Inc. v. Pac. Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001–02 (7th Cir. 2004); Charles J. Goetz
& Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 560–61 (1977).
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damages for non-performance.  This common law hostility towards penalty74
clauses originated in courts of equity, which by the end of the 17th century
were no longer willing to enforce the historical “penal bond,”  sending the75
parties instead to courts of law for a determination of actual monetary
damages.  Today, the common law renders a penalty clause generally76
unenforceable, and, in the case of U.S. law governing the sale of goods, deems
such a penalty “void.”77
Notably, the parties to a contract may accomplish some of the same
objectives as those they might seek to accomplish through a penalty clause by
framing the fixed sum due as a contractual performance obligation instead of
a remedy for breach. For example, a bonus that gives significant incentives for
performance would likely be fully enforceable, whereas a penalty for non-
performance would not. A fixed sum may also fairly be characterized as one
of two “alternative performances,” in which case the promised contractual
obligation to pay the amount due is likely to be enforced.78
One might be tempted to point to these examples in suggesting that the
common law approach to fixed sums is more about form than substance.
However, there is a crucial difference between the above contractual promise
to pay money as a performance obligation and a “penalty” clause triggered by
a breach—the former involve the parties’ rights and obligations, while the
latter involves a remedy for breach sought from a court or arbitral tribunal
after the parties’ agreement has run aground on the rocks of an intractable
dispute. When parties negotiate a contract, they typically focus far more on
their performance “rights and obligations” than on “remedies” in the event of
breach. Parties expect to perform—not to breach —so their exercise of79
74. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 73, at 558. This indifference between performance and payment
of damages is often referred to as the “indifference principle.” Hachem suggests that the value of a party’s
right to specific performance must be accounted for in applying this principle, thereby justifying the use
of a penalty intended to deter breach. See Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24, at 221. However, this mixes
the civil law right to such performance with a common law principle based on the damages as the normal
remedy. The civil law right to performance and the right to enforce a penalty clause go hand-in-glove—just
as the common law preference for damages and the invalidity of a penalty clause.
75. Perhaps the most famous “penal bond” was that of Antonio’s promise of a “pound of flesh” to
Shylock in the event of default on his promise to repay 300 Ducats. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
THE MERCHANT OF VENICE. See also STEWART MACAULEY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, vol. I,
THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE 107 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the “pound of flesh” and The Merchant of
Venice in connection with penalty clauses).
76. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, at 812; MURRAY, supra note 2, at 812–13.
77. U.C.C. § 2-718(1).
78. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 535–36 (6th ed. 2009).
79. It is sometimes said that art imitates life. Thus, one might reasonably look to Shakespeare for
the quintessential example of this phenomenon in The Merchant of Venice. Upon hearing of the “pound
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autonomy with respect to the former arguably deserves greater deference than
the latter.
The common law approach to penalties has unquestionably been subject
to substantial criticism by both courts  and commentators.  However, its80 81
continued application by the courts—in spite of such criticism—also proves
its continuing vitality as domestic U.S. law.  The most common modern82
justification for the rule is based on the theory of “efficient breach.” In effect,
society as a whole may be better served by a breach. If so, as long as the
aggrieved party receives monetary damages compensating for its expectation
loss, breach will be more efficient than performance.83
Critics argue that the “efficient breach” theory is flawed—both as a
matter of business reality and economic theory. Contrary to the traditional
theory of “efficient breach”—a penalty clause deterring breach may actually
be more efficient, because this will simply lead the parties to negotiate and
share the economic fruits of the contemplated breach.  However, this ignores84
the very real challenges inherent in negotiating in the context of what is
essentially a bilateral monopoly,  as well as the potential economic interests85
of third parties in an efficient breach.
Critics of the common law approach also often argue in favor of the
“utility” of penalty clauses by pointing to various forms of damages that are
difficult to calculate or prove.  However, these arguments miss the point that86
a true “liquidated damages” provision is, in fact, enforceable—thereby
of flesh” demanded by Shylock as a penal bond to secure Antonio’s performance, Bassanio rejects the idea,
fearing this penalty is simply too steep. However, Antonio happily accepts the deal offered by Shylock,
certain in the knowledge that “within these two months, that’s a month before this bond expires, I do expect
return of thrice three times the value of this bond.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE,
Scene III. Antonio, a sophisticated merchant, simply could not fathom the possibility that he would breach
his promise to repay Shylock at the appointed time. However, we know that sometimes the best of
intentions may be thwarted by unexpected events—whether in art or in life.
80. See, e.g., XCO Int’l, 369 F.3d at 1001–02; Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d
1284, 1288–89 (7th Cir. 1985).
81. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 73; Kenneth W. Clarkson et al., Liquidated Damages
v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351 (1978).
82. See, e.g., XCO Int’l, 369 F.3d at 1002–03; Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1289. Hachem points to
departures from this standard approach in certain areas, such as insurance law; Hachem, Agreed Sums,
supra note 24, at 148. However, these departures are sui generis and typically involve what is, essentially,
a tort, such as bad faith breach of an insurance contract.
83. See XCO Int’l, 369 F.3d at 1001; Lake River, 769 F.2d at 1289. For a more thorough analysis
the theory of “efficient breach,” see POSNER, supra note 72, at 149.
84. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 73, at 567–68.
85. See POSNER, supra note 72, at 78.
86. See id. at 160.
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addressing damages that are difficult to calculate or prove—and provisions
requiring the losing party to pay actual damages, which are simply difficult to
calculate or prove, are fully enforceable.
The above analysis is exemplary only and is not intended to be exhaustive
or to suggest that the common law approach is necessarily superior to that of
the civil law. In fact, there is much to commend in each. The point, for
purposes of this article, is simply to establish that the common law will not
enforce a “penalty” clause, as such, and that the reasons underlying this
approach are reasonably defensible and not wholly irrational.
4.2.3. The Relationship between the Treatment of Penalty Clauses and the
Treatment of Performance Based Remedies
The difference between the civil and common law treatment of penalty
clauses is mirrored in the treatment of performance-based remedies in the two
legal systems. The civil law treats specific performance as the ordinary
remedy for breach, while the common law treats specific performance as an
extraordinary remedy.  The common law approach to specific performance87
is based on the same doctrinal underpinnings as its approach to penalty
clauses—the ordinary common law of remedies is neutral, as between
performance and payment of damages in compensation for non-performance.
As in the case of penalty clauses, the common law’s treatment of
performance-based remedies reflects a general “economic” approach to
remedies.88
Admittedly, a court may, under proper circumstances, order specific
performance, notwithstanding the fact that such as award may be inconsistent
with this general neutrality. However, a discretionary award of specific
performance by a court of equity is far different than the grant of power to one
of the parties to compel performance through a punitive damages clause.
A more complete comparison of civil and common law approaches to
performance-based remedies is beyond the scope of this article. However, the
essential nature of the relationship between the treatment of penalty clauses
and performance-based remedies within the two legal systems is important in
understanding why the former are not governed by the CISG. The Convention,
87. See Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale of Goods?
Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314, 337 (2005).
88. See XCO Int’l, 369 F.3d at 1001 (explaining that the doctrine of efficient breach drives not only
the common law approach to penalties, but also the common law treatment of damages, as the normal
remedy, and specific relief, as extraordinary).
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itself, recognizes the divergent views in the treatment of performance-based
remedies, and the Secretariat Commentary on the Convention recognizes the
connection between this divergence and the issue of penalty clauses.
4.2.4. Divergent Views Recognized within the CISG Itself
The treatment of specific performance within the CISG demonstrates a
clear recognition of the fundamental differences between the two legal
systems with respect to a basic principle underlying contract remedies—the
civil law favors performance, while the common law is neutral as between
performance and compensation for non-performance. To the extent there is
any question as to the application and effect of Article 4 as excluding from the
CISG any question as to the validity of a penalty clause, Article 7(2) directs
us to the general principles underlying the CISG. We find such a principle
recognizing this fundamental difference between the civil and common law
in the interplay between Articles 46, 62, and 28.89
Articles 46 and 62, essentially, adopt the civil law approach to specific
performance. However, Article 28 limits the application of either in instances
in which a common law enforcing court would not order specific performance
under its own law.  The Secretariat Commentary to what would become90
Article 46  not only notes the limit provided through Article 28, but also91
specifically notes the similarities between the legal remedy of specific
performance and a contractual penalty clause used as a deterrent to breach.92
The Commentary goes on to note that such a “penalty clause” is “invalid” in
many legal systems, and that nothing in CISG Article 46 has “the effect of
making such clauses valid in those legal systems which do not otherwise
89. Hachem suggests that Article 28 has no relationship to any issue other than that of specific
performance. Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 24 n.38. However, the underlying principles supporting the
common law approach to issues of specific performance and issues as to the validity of penalty clauses are
very much related, as recognized in the Secretariat Commentary to Article 46.
90. See Ferrari, supra note 87, at 337–38 (explaining that the combined effects of Articles 46, 62,
and 28 reflected a compromise between the civil and common law approaches). Hachem seemingly suggests
that the existence of Articles 46 and 62 within the CISG reflect an international consensus on the issue of
performance based remedies. See Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 24, at 148. However, this argument
fails to account for the essential role of Article 28.
91. This is Article 42 of the 1978 draft.
92. Secretariat Commentary to the CISG art. 46, paras. 9 and 10. Hachem argues that the treatment
of specific performance in Articles 46 and 62 provides support for his position that penalty clauses must
ultimately be enforced based on the general principles of the Convention. Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra
note 24, at 146. However, this argument is strikingly inconsistent with the treatment of this issue in the
Secretariat Commentary.
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recognize their validity.”  Thus, the Secretariat Commentary provides clear93
recognition that the validity of a penalty clause is governed by otherwise
applicable law, even in the context of a transaction to which the CISG
(including Article 46) is applicable.
In summary, CISG Article 4 expressly relegates the validity of a penalty
clause to otherwise applicable law—not the CISG; Article 6 does not give the
parties any right to change this result; and the compromise represented by
Articles 46, 62, and 28 provides further indication that the CISG left the
specific issue of the enforceability of penalty clauses to otherwise applicable
domestic national law.
5. CONCLUSION
The issue of fixed sums is an important one in international transactions
in goods. As such, it seems quite reasonable to suggest that a uniform
approach to the treatment of agreements for fixed sums is desirable. However,
a single uniform approach across divergent legal systems today remains
elusive, and any effort to bridge this divide by reference to the CISG is quite
simply “a bridge too far.”
93. Secretariat Commentary to the CISG art. 46, para. 10.
